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Determinants of Military Expenditures 
in Developing Countries 
Robert E. Looney* 
Previous Studies on the Determinants of Public Expenditures 
Relatively few studies have examined the patterns of government 
spending policy in developing countries and, in particular, the amount 
of central government budgets allocated to defense. 
In an early work, Martin and Lewis 1 analyzed the size and com-
position of public expenditures and revenues for 16 countries, 10 
of which can be classified as developing. Public expenditures were 
divided into current and capital expenditures and for each group a 
functional classification was made. For current expenditures, it was 
found that the richer countries spent more than poorer countries 
relative to GNP on defense, public debt, social security programs, and 
food and agricultural subsidies. The relative importance of the remain-
ing government expenditures (basic expenditures) was not related to 
per capita income. 
The study by Martin and Lewis was one of the first empirical tests of 
'Wagner's Law', which posits the existence of a positive relationship 
between the size of the public sector and the level of economic 
development. Wagner2 argued that public expenditure could be 
divided into two categories, security. and welfare, and that security 
expenditures were bound to increase with the growth of the 'pro-
gressive' state as armies became larger and more capital-intensive and 
as, in addition, the increased intrastate conflict between individuals 
that was generated by industrialization necessitated expanded police 
services. In a similar manner, welfare expenditures would also increase 
with the level of economic development as the state gradually took on 
many of the private sector's former responsibilities such as education 
and public health. 
Cross-section Analysis of Military Expenditure Patterns 
Workers using cross-section analysis, such as those testing Wagner's 
Law, have not considered explicitly the manner in which government 
spending decisions were subject to revenue constraints and, in parti-
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cular, the role played by external financing. That such constraints exist 
for developing countries has been emphasized by Peacock and Wise-
man,3 and for developing countries, Heller has stressed that: 
In a highly developed country, tax policy tends to accept the level 
of expenditures as its revenue goal ... The sequence of decision 
tends to run from expenditures to tax. But in underdeveloped 
countries, the level of expenditures depends much more heavily 
on the ability of the tax system to place required revenues at the 
disposal of the government ... in this sense the sequence tends to 
run from taxation to expenditure.4 
In the following section, an attempt will be made to gain some under-
standing of the effects of revenue constraint and external sources of 
funding on the patterns of military expenditure in our sample of 
developing countries. 
The data base used for cross-section analysis differs from those used 
in previous expenditure studies in two respects. First the sample is 
much larger - the initial data base includes 96 countries. Second, 
the data base comprises both economic and socio-political variables. 
Economic variables were taken from the World Bank data base,5 the 
International Monetary Fund, 6 and the Yale Data Base on Political and 
Social Indicators.7 Military expenditure variables were taken from the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.8 
Previous Studies 
A more complete formulation of Wagner's law can be stated as follows: 
in industrializing countries, public sector activities and expenditures 
grow in relative importance as real per capita income increases. 
According to Wagner, there are essentially three reasons to expect 
expanding state activity and expenditures. First, the state has to expand 
its administrative and protective functions because of the increasing 
complexity of legal relationships and communications. Second, the 
state has to expand its activities due to the increase in general public 
services required by an increasingly affluent society. Third, increases in 
population and urbanization require higher public expenditures on law 
and order and economic regulation to maintain the efficient operation 
of an increasingly complex economy amidst the rising frictions of urban 
life. 
Wagner also predicted a substantial expansion of public expenditure 
on education and distribution of income. Although his reasons for the 
expansion of these public activities were unclear in his exposition, 
Wagner appears to have assumed that they constituted 'superior 
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goods'. In other words, the income elasticity of demand for public ser-
vices such as education and income redistribution is greater than unity. 
A final element in the Wagner framework is the concept that, as 
industrialization progresses, technological change and large-scale 
investment expenditures require larger amounts of capital than the 
private sector can supply. Therefore, the state has to provide the 
necessary capital to finance large-scale investment projects. 
Naturally, the 'Law' of expanding state activity has been severely 
criticized by commentators who argue, for example, that it is wrong to 
regard the development process as a unique linear trend common to 
all nations.9 However, taking the 'Law' at face value and applying 
it to the present subject matter, we should anticipate a positive corre-
lation between the level of economic development (measured by, for 
example, per capita income) and the relative size of the defense sector 
(that is: the defense burden or defense expenditure as a proportion of 
the national income). 
A major test of Wagner's Law was undertaken by Lotz,10 who 
investigated several components of public expenditures, of which 
defense was one. A factor analysis of 37 developing countries (using 
mid-1960s cross-section data) resulted in Lotz's conclusion that 
defense spending was not closely related to the particular stage of 
development. 
In order to isolate the determinants of the defense burden (D/Y) 
Lotz performed a regression analysis on the data and included as 
independent variables GNP per head (Y /P), mineral and oil exports 
(MX) which were a proxy for natural resource endowments, the 
proportion of the population which was urbanized (U) and the total 
government budget as a share of income (B/Y). The result was as 
follows: 
D/Y = 0.26 - 0.006Y/P + 0.020MX + 0.048U + 0.081B/Y 
(-3.51) (1.80) (2.64) (2.19) 
r2 = 0.366 
The final coefficient is exactly in line with the predictions of 
Wagner's Law: the total budget and the defense budget appear to be 
positively associated. Furthermore, if we take urbanization as a proxy 
for the level of economic development, the predicted result is again 
confirmed. A slightly less statistically sound relationship is observed 
between defense and natural endowments, although we should expect 
a close relationship for the obvious reason that nations with abundant 
natural resources can afford to spend on defense and will also be 
anxious to protect their wealth from external aggression or internal 
secessionist movements. 
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In spite of these significant results, the anticipated relationship 
between defense and income does not appear; rather, the relationship 
is inverse, a result that is confirmed by the value of the correlation 
coefficient between D/Y and YIP estimated at -0.16. Lotz explains this 
result by the hypothesis that there exists a certain minimum size for a 
military establishment, determined by technical factors, which implies 
a fixed expenditure level irrespective of the size of national income. 
Smaller, poorer nations have, therefore, been obliged to spend more 
than their fair share on defense owing to their fears of the mobilization 
of other more affluent states. 
In an update of the Lotz study, Whynes, 11 using IISS 12 data (around 
1977) for 83 nations - 30 developed (excluding USA and USSR) 
and 53 developing nations - obtained the following correlation co-
efficients: 
Defense Expenditure and GDP 













The first set of correlations suggests that the richer the nation, the more 
resources it devotes to defense, both being expressed in absolute terms. 
This relationship is particularly strong for the developed countries and, 
according to Whynes, is to be expected on an intuitive level - the richer 
the nation, the more the economy can afford to divert resources away 
from civil production. The slightly weaker LDC relationship is also 
consistent with the above but might, too, support the Lotz thesis that a 
number of the poorer states are obliged to overspend for strategic 
reasons. 
As far as the defense burden is concerned, the DC sample displays 
quite a strong negative correlation - high burdens are associated with 
lower, rather than higher, incomes. This apparent reversal of that 
which was predicted can be explained by considering countries 
included in the DC sample. First, according to Whynes, many of the 
medium-to-high income states are members of alliances and this factor 
is significant. As defense exhibits public goods properties (i.e., if any 
amount is provided to one member of the group, than it is provided 
equally to all), defensive alliances are regarded as being efficient in that 
partners can agree on the provision of the appropriate amount of 
defense which each may consume and they may then share the costs 
among themselves. However, once an alliance has been established, it 
will be in the interests of the members to 'fliee ride', by contributing as 
small a share of the resources as possible, in the hope that a more risk-
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adverse or wealthier partner will subsidize them. This is certainly the 
case in NATO and WTO, where most of the medium-income members 
contribute less than the average burden of 5 percent and 11 percent, 
respectively; they are, in fact, heavily subsidized by the extra 
expenditure undertaken by the USA and USSR (which were not 
included in Whynes's sample and whose defense burdens exceeded the 
alliance averages, while their individual strategies dictated that 
defense escalation must continue). 
Second, according to Whynes, several high income states such as 
Switzerland, Sweden and Japan remain outside the defensive alliances 
and have not become involved in the arms race, which has to some 
extent been forced upon NATO and WTO by the superpowers. The 
requirements of the alliances, which oblige most NATO and WTO 
members to attempt to 'follow the leaders', mean that the average 
defense burden in the allied countries is about twice that of unaligned 
countries (3.5 percent to 1.7 percent). 
Third, Whynes noted that several of the low income developing 
countries possess high defense burdens for a variety of reasons: Israel 
for obvious reasons, while Greece and Turkey spend relatively large 
amounts on defense in response to internal turmoil. Others have found 
it necessary to spend on defense as a result of their exclusion from 
alliances- Albania, for instance, left WTO in 1968 and now prefers to 
defend itself in isolation. Both it and Yugoslavia find themselves in a 
strategically dangerous position on the interface between East and 
West confrontation. In such cases, isolationism has posed security 
problems and necessitated correspondingly high levels of defense 
provision. 
In general, Whynes's study found a positive association, as originally 
hypothesized by Wagner's Law. The relationship is not particularly 
strong, however, and clearly a number of other factors must be 
included for a thorough explanation of the observed patterns of 
defense expenditures. 
In a major International Monetary Fund study, 13 it was found that the 
share of defense expenditures in the total government budget was not 
associated with per capita income. In general, the study found that the 
same variables as those influencing general administrative expenses 
proved to be significant for defense. The most striking difference was 
that, whereas urbanization had a negative impact on the share in GDP 
of general administrative expenditures, it has a positive relationship 
with defense. Defense expenditure, according to this study, could be 
expected to be higher in a more urbanized country, with a larger 
proportion of children of 14 years and younger, and a larger public 
sector (net of defense spending). The study concludes: 14 
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While numerous influences not tested in this study (and indeed 
impossible to test) must influence defense spending, and while 
the low correlation coefficient (.15) suggests a large amount of 
"unexplained" defense expenditure, the significant variables 
mentioned above are interesting. It seems reasonable to consider 
that urbanized societies must spend more on defense and are 
willing to do so. Likewise, it is reasonable to expect that many 
authorities who are prepared to run a large public sector are also 
likely to accept the idea that a substantial part of the national 
budget is being spent on defense. 
It should be noted that the IMF study is heavily weighted with advanced 
industrial countries. 
Implications for the Current Study 
Based on the literature cited above, a main thesis of the current study is 
that, while Wagner's Law provides useful insights into the relationship 
between per capita income and defense expenditures, per capita 
income is likely to be only one of several factors ultimately determining 
the level of defense expenditures and their relative share in govern-
ment budgets. In other words, the determinants of defense expendi-
tures are multidimensional. 
The central problem of the cross-section studies is the lack of any 
historical dimension. While it might certainly be true that there exist 
certain tendencies toward public sector expansion with development, 
each country will be following its own particular path through time, 
encountering its own peculiar economic, political and strategic 
problems. Countries at a similar stage of development (even assuming 
that this can be defined) might, therefore, possess completely different 
sizes of public sector and defense budgets. Examples are Israel and 
New Zealand, both with per capita incomes of around $3500 but with 
defense burdens of 33.9 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively. Again, 
Afghanistan and Bangladesh are, in many ways, similar countries 
(including an almost identical level of per capita income), yet the 
farmer's defense burden is nearly four times that of the latter. 
The thesis developed below is that previous attempts to explain 
defense expenditure patterns using cross-section data have failed 
because they did not systematically incorporate various factors that 
determine either government budgets or the constraints on financing 
additional expenditures. By incorporating the financing of govern-
ment expenditures, the cross-section analysis presented in the follow-
ing sections is able to capture the historical-environmental dimension 
lacking in previous studies. 
• 
! 
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Discriminant Analysis 
As noted above, several studies 15 have indicated that developing 
countries may lack homogeneity with regard to either the factors 
surrounding the decision to increase defense expenditures or the 
impact that defense expenditures have on the overall economic growth 
of the country (and thereby feed back to affect their allocation in a later 
time period). With regard to the impact of defense expenditures on 
economic growth, Frederiksen and Looney contend that: 16 
One can argue that under certain circumstances defense spending 
can help growth while under a different set of circumstances, it 
can hinder growth. Indeed, both propositions are likely to be true 
for the same country at different points in time. 
On the positive side, defense spending may contribute to the 
growth of the civilian economy by: (1) feeding, clothing and 
housing a number of people who would otherwise have to be fed, 
housed and clothed by the civilian economy, (2) providing 
education and medical care as well as vocational and technical 
training, (3) engaging in a variety of public works - roads, dams, 
river improvements, airports, communication networks, etc. -
that may in part serve civilian uses, and (4) engaging in scientific 
and technical specialities which would otherwise have to be 
performed by civilian personnel. 
They add that on the negative side: 17 
There are at least three different types of possible effects. The 
first, named the "income shift" by Benoit, is that increases in 
defense expenditures will reduce the civilian GDP and will thus 
tend to decrease growth proportionately. Second, it is possible 
that defense spending adversely affects growth since the govern-
ment sector for the most part exhibits "negligible rates of 
measurable productivity increases." Finally, growth can suffer 
since increased spending on defense uses resources which could 
have been better employed as civilian investment. 
Frederiksen and Looney 18 note that while these arguments make 
intuitive sense, the crucial determinant of the impact of defense 
expenditures on economic growth is the country's financial resource 
constraint. According to them, a country which is severely resource 
constrained (i.e., faces some combination of lagging taxes, reduced 
private and government savings, reduced borrowing power overseas, 
export shortfalls, etc.) will probably face budget cuts. In order to 
maintain defense programs, the high growth development programs 
will be sacrificed:19 
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This is likely for two reasons. First, it is usually more politically 
acceptable to curtail capital investment (on infrastructure, for 
example) than expenditures on the current account. Second, 
given that a well-established military establishment already 
exists, there will be the obvious pressure to maintain the status 
quo. These special interest groups might included high ranking 
officers, military contractors, and certain political groups. As 
budgets are reduced, the military share is frozen and the brunt of 
the deflationary policy is borne by development projects which 
we assume are relatively productive. In short, defense expendi-
tures are likely to be asymmetric - difficult to cut back but easily 
expanded. Thus, for resource-constrained countries, we should 
expect a negative relationship between defense spending and 
economic growth. 
The authors contend that the opposite is likely to hold for countries 
with a relative abundance of financial resources - an elastic supply of 
tax revenues, a high inflow of foreign exchange and the like:20 
These countries can more easily afford the capital investment 
programs necessary for economic growth while maintaining or 
even increasing defense programs. 
They conclude that:21 
If this thesis is correct, one can see why previous authors have 
failed to find any consistency between economic growth and 
defense. Using a model based on resource constraints, however, 
it is easy to see why developing countries with identical levels of 
defense spending can experience very different growth levels: 
richer countries are apparently able to invest in development 
programs while, on the other hand, poorer countries have had to 
sacrifice these programs to pay for defense. 
Since their hypothesized relationship between defense and economic 
growth depended on financial resource constraints, their sample of 
developing countries was separated into either resource-constrained 
or non resource-constrained groups by means of cluster analysis. While 
a large number of conceivable proxy measures could be used to indicate 
the relative abundance or scarcity of financial resources, the selection 
of those used in the cluster analysis was based on the ratios of gross 
domestic invesunent to GDP in 1960 and 1978 and the ratios of gross 
domestic savings to GDP in 1960 and 1978 (data taken from the 1980 
World Bank World Development Report). The cluster analysis 
produced two distinct groups: one having high levels of savings and 
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investment to GDP, the other having low ratios of savings and invest-
ment to GDP. . 
Linear regression equations were estimated for each group.22 
The most striking result and one that supports our hypothesis, is 
that the coefficient of the defense variable was positive and 
statistically significant at the 99 percent level for the richer group. 
While the coefficient for the defense variables for the poorer 
group was negative (as hypothesized) it was not statistically 
different from zero. 
Based on the above-cited results it makes sense to split the sample of 
developing countries into groups based on some measure of resource 
constraint. Presumably, those countries who have either more 
domestic resources (savings and investment) or more access to foreign 
capital (everything else equal, such as gross national product) will be 
able to support a higher level of defense expenditures. On the other 
hand, those countries with a lower level of domestic resources or less 
access to international capital will (everything else equal) not have as 
high a level of defense expenditures. Using factor analysis with a 
number of measures of debt and capital flows to measure the main 
trends in the data, a discriminant analysis 23 was performed using as 
variables those with the highest loading on each one of the individual 
factors. The orthogonal rotation asssures that each variable selected 
had a relatively low degree of correlation with the others in the sample. 
The variables thus selected for splitting the countries into two groups 
were: 
1. Gross Inflow of Public Loans/Exports 1982 
2. Total Public External Debt, 1982 
3. Gross International Reserves, 1982 
4. Public External Debt as a % of GDP, 1982 
5. Growth in Imports, 1970-82 
6. External Debt Service as a% of GDP, 1982 
7. Public External Debt as a% of GDP, 1970. 
The results of the discriminant analysis (Table 1) show a high degree of 
probability of correct placement in each group, i.e., the discriminating 
variables selected from the factor analysis are able to split the sample 
countries into two fairly distinct groupings based largely on the external 
debt situation facing each set of countries. Group II countries consist of 
several major oil exporters and several of the more dynamic newly 
industrializing nations such as Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, 
Algeria and Malaysia. Group I countries in general seem to be the 
poorer, less economically dynamic nations: this group being heavily 
weighted with African and poorer Latin American countries. 
• 
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Further insight into the two groups can be gained by examining the 
means (Table 2) of the variables used in the discriminant analysis: 
1. Group I countries resorted to a much higher (3.6 times) inflow 
of external public loans in 1982 relative to their exports that year. 
2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public external 
debt in 1982 averages nearly four and one halftimes as much for 
Group II countries as is the case for Group I countries. 
3. The level of international reserves is also much higher for 
Group II countries - nearly 10 times as much as the average for 
Group I countries. 
4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic product, 
however, Group I countries have much higher levels of attain-
ment, averaging nearly twice as much as Group II countries in 
both 1970 and 1982. The debt service ratio to exports is cor-
respondingly higher for Group I countries. 
5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly ten times higher over 
the 1970-82 period for Group II countries. 
In terms of profiles, therefore, the Group II countries are considerably 
larger, more affluent, and less reliant on external debt as a percentage 
of gross domestic product. They tend to spend relatively large amounts 
on military activities, but not necessarily significantly greater amounts 
of their overall budgets. 
Analysis of Total Military Expenditure 
Based on the profiles of the countries in Group I and Group II, one 
might anticipate that public external debt and external capital flows 
have played a much greater role in facilitating military expenditures in 
the former group. The Group II countries appear to be less dependent 
on external debt and capital flows as a means of maintaining or 
increasing their military expenditures, i.e., they have more alternative 
means by which military expenditures can be financed. 
To test this hypothesis, total military expenditure was analysed first 
by factor analysis, then by regression analysis. The factor analysis 
showed the general manner by which the Group I and Group II 
countries differ from one another (in terms of the loading of the various 
measures of military expenditures on economic factors), and how the 
groups differ individually from the total sample of countries. The 
regression analysis was undertaken to obtain a more precise delinea-
tion and qualification of the economic variables most responsible for 
the observed differences in military expenditures between countries. 
The factor analysis began with the original set of economic variables. 
• 
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Gross domestic product and gross national product per capita were 
added, along with a measure of military expenditure. The first measure 
of military expenditure examined was total military expenditure: 
1. For the total sample of countries, military expenditure (Table 
3) loads highest at 43 on Factor 3. This particular factor represents 
the level of gross national reserves and gross national product. As 
discussed above, the pattern was not particularly clear for the 
sample as a whole. 
2. For the Group I countries, total military expenditure (Table 4) 
has a loading of 100 on Factor I. This particular factor represents 
most of the major debt measures- total public debt for 1982, total 
public debt for 1970 and so on. 
3. For Group II countries, total military expenditures loaded 
highest at 59 on the public debt measures for 1970 (Table 5), with<\ 
smaller loading of 51 on export growth and a negative loading of 
-44 on factors affecting public external debt/exports for 1982. 
In sum, the factor analysis of the separate groups of countries produced 
by the discriminant analysis provided significantly different pictures 
from those of the sample as a whole of the economic variables 
associated with total military expenditures. The factor analysis for the 
total sample of countries indicates that gross national product per 
capita and international reserves play a large role in affecting military 
expenditures, while separate analysis of Group I countries indicates a 
strong association between military expenditure and debt. The Group 
II countries appear to have more diverse (yet significantly different) 
patterns linking underlying economic forces to expenditure on 
defense-related activities. 
Based on the results of the factor analysis, the number of variables 
for regression analysis was expanded by adding the main factors upon 
which military expenditures loaded heavily in the data set. Step-wise 
forward regressions indicated that the most important variable 
affecting total military expenditure for the total sample countries was 
the share of military expenditure (1981) in total government budget 
(GEDB), followed by the gross domestic product (GDPB) and then 
the public external debt in 1970 (PDA). Gross national product per 
capita (GNPPER) was also significant in the regression equations. 
Debt service as a percent of exports in 1982 (DEEB) was significant but 
had a negative sign, as did public external borrowing commitments/ 
exports in 1982 (PBCB). The most satisfactory equation estimating 
military expenditures (Equation 9, Table 6) explains nearly 79 percent 
of the fluctuations in military expenditures. A. comparison of predicted 
versus actual values estimated by Equation 9, Table 7, however, 
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indicates that only one country- the Philippines - had a predicted value 
within 5 percent of the actual level of military expenditure. 
Regressions on military expenditure for the Group I countries 
(Table 8) produced, as might be expected, a highly positive correlation 
between the public debt in 1982 (PDB) and total military expenditures 
(total public debt in 1982 was not statistically significant in explaining 
military expenditures for the total sample). As with the total sample, 
the share of defense expenditures in the total government budget 
(GEDB) was also statistically significant; however, the size of the 
standardized coefficient was about twice as large for the total sample 
as for the Group I countries. Population (POP) is also positively 
correlated with military expenditures in the Group I countries, as is the 
net inflow of external loans in 1970 (ECNIA). As with the total sample, 
the debt service as a proportion of exports in 1982 (DSEB) was 
statistically significant and negative. Interestingly, the public debt 
in 1970 (PDA), so important in explaining the pattern of military 
expenditures for the total sample, is not statistically significant when 
the regression equation includes population (POP) and net external 
capital inflows for 1979 (ECNIA). 
Regression equations for total military expenditure for the Group II 
countries (Table 9) found, as with the two previous sample groups, a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with the share of 
military expenditures in the total government budget (GEDB). The 
standardized coefficient for this variable averages around .55 or 
slightly higher than that for the total sample, but about twice that for 
Group I countries. Gross domestic product (GDPB) is also statistically 
significant as is the total public debt in 1970 (PDA), which was not 
statistically significant for Group I countries. In sharp contrast to 
Group I, the public debt in 1982 (PDB) is highly significant and 
negative for Group II, as are population (POP), public external 
borrowing commitments in 1982 (PBCB), and gross capital inflows/ 
exports in 1982 (ECIBE). 
Group II countries, then, present a picture of countries that bor-
rowed fairly heavily in the early 1970s in order to facilitate military 
expenditures but who, by the early 1980s, were finding that the debt 
accumulated at that point in time was, for one reason or another, a 
hindrance to further expansion in the military budget. Group I 
countries, however, appear to have used external capital inflows 
toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s as a means of increasing the 
amount of funds allocated to the military sector. Group· I countries 
might also be using military expenditure as an employment device -
evidenced by the positive sign for population; while Group II countries 
might be finding that the demands of non-military expenditures 
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(represented by a negative sign for population) caused a reduction in 
military spending. 
The regression equations for Group II (Table 10), in contrast with 
those for the total sample, explain well over 95 percent of the fluctua-
tions in military expenditures for the group as a whole. 
Summary-Conclusions 
In summary, the basic regression equation for total military expendi-
,. tures shows the following differences by sample group: 
GEDB PDB PDA POP GDPB GNPPER 
.! Total + 0 + 0 + + 
Group I + + 0 + 0 0 
Group II + + + 0 
Where GEDB = share of military expenditures in total government 
budget; PDB =total public external debt, 1982; PDA =public debt, 
1970; POP = population, 1982; GDPB = gross domestic product, 
1982; and GNNPER = gross national product per capita for 1982. + = 
statistically significant and positive sign at 95% level. - = statistically 
significant and negative sign at 95% level. 0 =statistically insignificant. 
The results therefore appear to lend strong support to the idea of 
treating military expenditures in developing countries as being affected 
by a set of common factors specific to groups of countries, rather than 
by a set of factors common to developing countries as a whole. It should 
be noted that the results of the regression presented above for the total 
sample, Group I, Group II were not significantly affected by the 
exclusion of the Middle East countries. 
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TABLE l 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS TOTAL SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
BASED" ON ECON<J4IC F'ACTOR ANALYSIS HIGH LOAOINGS 





1. Israel 69.34 1. Greece 
2. Honduras 83.48 z. Indf a 
3. Cameroon 60.73 3. Nf gerf a 
4. Sudan 66.47 4. Indonesia 
s. Cos ta Rf ca 92.64 5. Egypt 
6. Bol fvla 86.27 6. Korea 
7. Scnal fa 86.46 7. Rwanda 
8. Tunfsfa 68.Jl 8. Turkey 
9. Morocco 73.06 9. Spain 
10. Guatl!l'llal a 54.91 10. Venezuela 
11. Mal awl 91.40 11. Mexico 
12. El Salvador 65.90 12. 8razfl 
13. Malf 97 .12 13. Al gerfa 
14. Pakf stan 86.98 14. Ph11fppfnes 
15. Paraguay 60.02 15. Libya 
16. Ecuador 56.61 16. Colanbfa 
17. Oolllf nf can Repub 11 c 74.12 17. Th4fland 
18. Lfberfa 94.77 18. Malayasfa 
19. Ivory Coast 84.42 19. Argentina 
20. Maurf tanf a 96.04 20. Saudi Arabf a 
21. Sferra Leone 86.05 21. Kuwaf t 
22. Panaioa 94.37 22. Syrfa 
23. Chile 70.09 23. Jordan 
24. Chad 87.18 
ZS. Uroguay 67 .87 
26. Tanzania 79.87 
27. Uganda 88.76 
28. Ethiopia 70.24 
29. Cen. African Rep. 76.89 
30. Ghana 78.72 
31. Bunna 82. 91 
32. Srf Lanka 75.39 
33. Jamaica 90.66 
34. Trfnfdad 77 .62 
JS. Zani> fa 95.88 
36. Peru 71.67 
37. Zfni>abw 85.68 
38. Kenya 86.61 
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TABLE 2 
Means of Dlscrlml nant Analysis Variables 
Totftl Group Group Latin 
Variable Sam!!le I II America 
Discriminating Variables 
ECIBE 0.70 0.94 0.26 0.46 
POD 5932.00 2629.30 11786.90 8041.90 
GIRO 2587.20 583.80 6138.80 2024.30 
POPB 35.30 44.30 19.20 35.90 
ZB 4.10 J.09 9.50 2.10 
DSEB 14.10 15.00 12.50 18.30 
POPA 17.30 21.20 10.40 14.70 
Discriminating Variables 
HEY 4.20 3.60 s.10 2.12 
GNPPER 1793.20 1066.70 3048.20 1861.40 
HEP 117.90 57. 70 223.30 39.70 
GEIJB 14.10 13.40 15.30 9.90 
HE 1318.10 389.10 2943.90 571.20 
ECIBE • Gross Inflow of Public Loans 1982 Dlvfded by Exports 1982 
PDB • External Public Debt 1982 
GIRB • Gross International Reserves 1982 
PDPB •External Public Debt as a Percentage of Gross D0111estfc Product 1982 
ZB • Average Annual Growth In Imports 1970-82 
OSEB • Debt Service as a Percentage or Exports 1982 
POP.A • External Public Debt 11 1 Percentage of Gross DOIM!stlc Product 1970 
HEY • Hllltary Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross National Product 1981 
GNPPER • Per Capita Gross National Product 1982 
HEP • Hllltary Expenditure Per Capita 1981 
GEDB •Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditure 

















TABLE 3 w ..... 
0 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (STANDARD REGRESSION COEF"f"ICI ENTS): ECONIJllC VARIABLES, 
TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Factors Factors Factors 
Affecting Facilitating Affecting External Public 
Total Public Total Debt/ Growth Debt External 
External Consumption Hfl I tary Exports In Service Debt 
Var lab lf'S Oebt 1982 Share Expenditure 
lfepayment of Principal on 
1982 Consumption 1982 1970 
Public External loans 1970 100* -4 -4 0 -27 8 0 
Payment of Interest on External 
Public Debt 1970 97* -9 -1 6 -24 3 9 
Total Public External Debt 1982 95* 1 -2 4 11 14 6 
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1982 94* 2 -4 2 15 11 -13 
Payment of Interest on External 
Public Debt 1982 89* 0 -2 0 12 23 -15 
Pub 11 c External Borrow! ng 
Conmf tments 1982 88* -4 -4 7 27 3 -5 
Gross Inflow Public loans 1970 86* -2 3 3 -8 7 41 
Total Public External Debt 1970 7D* -7 0 6 -ID -8 53 
Repayf'nt of Principal on Public 
External Debt 1982 61* 2 14 -4 26 37 12 ~ Gross Domestfc Product 1982 52* -15 44 0 7 -24 -7 
Growth In Exports 1970-82 46* 23 4 -37 -18 -22 -12 (') 
Current Account Balance 1970 -87* -11 17 5 -10 6 -5 0 z 
Growth In Exports 1960-70 14 85* -13 -7 5 -45 -8 ~ 
12 
• 
TABLE 3 (cont'd) 0 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (STANDARD REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS): ECONC»41C VARIABLES, I TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
z 
Factors Factors Factors > Affecting Fae fl ltatlng Affecting External Pub lie z 
...., Total Publfc Total Debt/ Growth Debt External tll 
External Consumption Mi 11 tary Exports In Service Debt ~ Variables Debt 1982 Share Ex!!endlture 1982 Consumj!tfon 1982 1970 Gross Inflow Public Loans 
:::: 1982/GDP 1982 9 87* 1 26 -4 0 -10 E Public Consumption as i GOP 1982 -2 82* 18 1 -19 7 12 ~ Public External Debt i GDP 1982 4 78* -13 14 -11 16 8 
Exports as i GOP 1982 -7 75* 21 -10 6 21 -6 ~ Public Consumption i GDP 1960 -15 71* -7 -11 14 -3 11 
z 
Resource balance i GDP 1982 24 -53* 13 -26 -10 55 0 0 
-
Gross International Reserves Cl 
1982 
-13 -12 89* 0 13 -11 11 rn • 
Gross National Product per 
Capita 1982 -7 10 86* 0 -13 15 19 
Gross International Reserves 
1970 12 -2 83* -9 -12 -15 -14 
Total Military Expenditures 
1981 37 16 43* -14 -1 -26 26 
Current Account Balance 1982 -19 4 -50* 5 -14 30 29 
Private Consumption i GOP 1960 23 -12 -63* -3 9 -37 0 
Average Ma turfty of External w 




TABLE 3 (coRt'd) N 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (STANDARD REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS): ECON!Jo!IC VARIABLES, 
TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Factors Factors Factors 
Affecting Facflftatlng Affecting External Publfc 
Total Public Total Debt/ Growth Debt External 
External Consumption Mllf tary Exports In Service Debt 
hrlables Debt 1982 Share Expenditure 1982 Consumption 1982 1970 
1u611c External Loan C0111111lbilents/ 
Exports 1982 3 0 -3 95* 4 -20 -8 
Gross Inflow Public Loans/ 
Exports 1982 8 13 11 88* -7 0 -12 
Public External Debt/Exports 
1982 4 2 -8 88* -2 -4 11 
Growth In Private Consumption 
1970-82 -11 -10 6 20 86* 8 14 
Growth fn !•ports 1970-82 11 -7 -2 -8 82* -24 -6 
Growth tn Public Consumption 
1970-82 2 4 -23 -19 68* -1 -5 
Tenws of Trade 1982 20 21 26 5 46* 13 22 
Debt Service External Public 
Debt S Exports 1982 24 3 -7 -6 -4 74* 18 ~ 
Private Consumption S GDP 1987 -12 -38 -37 -6 -21 -41* -9 ~ Vl 
Net Inflow Public External Loans (') 
1970 60 0 8 4 7 5 65* 0 z 
Public External Debt S GDP 1970 0 12 -31 -6 5 36 58* ~ 
12 
•• •1 fl Ip 
:,~. • 
,. 
TABLE 4 ti 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (STANDARD REGRESSION COffFIC!ENTS): ECONctllC VARIABLES, ~ TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1981, GROUP I COUNTRIES Factors z 
ac ors u c > Deten11i nan ts Facf 1 ftati ng External Growth Growth External z 
of Total Share of Debt to fn fn Debt >-3 
Military Public Debt Exports Pub lie Private Share of en 
Variables Expend I tures Consumption Servicing 1982 Consumptf on Con sump ton GDP 1970 0 
Total M111 tary 'I1 
Ex~endltures 1981 100* 4 -20 -2 -13 0 1 ~ Ne Inflow PUbilc External 
Loans 1970 97* 8 6 2 -9 -1 27 =3 
Total Public Debt 1982 95* -3 -9 14 10 11 2 ~ 
Gross International Reserves ~ 1982 92* -4 3 -11 -13 6 9 GNP Per Ca pi ta 1982 88* -11 -11 14 6 -4 1 z 
Total Public Debt 1970 87* 4 31 -3 -10 -5 25 ~ 
Gross Inflow Public Loans ~ 1970 85* 8 37 2 -7 -1 27 
Interest Payments External 
Debt 1982 82* -3 4 1 34 6 -2 
Repayment of Prf ncf pal on 
Public External Loans 1982 79* -4 1 0 28 12 -22 
Gross International Reserves 
1970 77* -9 10 -18 0 -12 -29 
Gross Inflow Publfc Loans 
1982 73* 2 23 12 15 5 -24 
Pub 1f c External Borrowing 
-32 w Comnrl tment 1982 71* 0 21 10 9 9 ...... 
w 
TABLE 4 (cont'd) w 
..... 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR 'ATIEIN (STANDARD REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS): ECONIJ41C VARIABLES, ~ 
TOTAi. MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1981, GROUP I COUNTRIES 
F1ctors 
f'lctors Pu61 le 
Deterwt nan ts F1c11fhtlng Extern1l Growth Growth htern1l 
of Tohl Shire of Debt to fn fn Debt 
Mil f tlry Pub lie Debt Exports Public Prfnte Sh1re or 
Ylrhbles Expend! tuns Consl!lptlon Servicing 1982 Consuaptfon Con sump ton GDP 1970 
Average Miturlty or 
External Debt 1982 -9 10 -o* -26 -24 0 11 
Pub 1 lc External Debt/ 
Exports 1982 4 1 0 94* -16 9 22 
Pub 1 fc External Borrowf ng 
93* C111al men ts/Exports 1982 2 
' 
5 -26 11 -19 
Gross Inflow Public External 
loans/Export 1982 -1 9 ll 99* 1 -4 -3 
Growth In Exports 1970-82 36 16 24 -41* -15 19 -7 
Growth fn Public Consumption 
69* 1970-82 -33 2 -0 -21 24 8 
External Debt Service I of 
Exports 1982 18 -4 14 -U u* Zl -5 
Private Consumption I of 
_79* GDP 1982 -12 -30 1 -2 -3 -9 
Growth fn !•ports 1970-82 -1 5 u -9 14 86* 24 
Growth f n Pr Iva te ~ Cons1111ptfon 1970-82 12 -14 -20 30 15 81* 22 
Tenas of Trade 1982 7 48 -14 -4 27 47* 
tn 
3 (".) 
Private Cons111ptton I of 0 
GOP 1960 -34 -18 22 9 3 24 72* ~ Pub 1 lc External Debt S 
of GOP 1970 39 7 0 -5 15 24 58* I:"" 
TABLE 4 (cont' di I OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (STANDARD REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS): ECONCMIC VARIABLES, TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1981, GROUP I COUNTRIES Factors z ec ors u c ~ Detennf nan ts Fac11 ltatfng External Growth Growth External 
of Total Share of Debt to In fn ~bt Cil Mil ltary Publfc Exports Public Private Share of 
Variables Ex end tures Cons 1982 Consum tlon Consum ton GDP 1970 0 
- - - - -
'T1 
Current Account, Balance 
-72* ~ of Payments 1982 0 -25 s 7 -8 14 ~ Current Account, Balance 
-84* of Payments 1970 -6 51 3 2 14 -18 "<! 
Growth of Exports 1960-70 -22 95* 8 -4 -6 1 3 ~ Gross Inflow Public Loans/ z GOP 1982 -14 as* 20 19 16 -5 -16 ~ Public External Debt S of 
GDP 1982 -13 93* 7 10 26 -5 7 
rn Public Cons1J11ptlon S of 
GDP 1960 11 91* -14 -19 -23 20 -2 
Public Cons1111ptlon S of 
68* GDP 1982 42 -13 4 15 -21 -2 
Exports S of GDP 1982 5 65* 3 0 49 -20 
Resource Ba lance S of GOP -1 -10* 13 -5 53 -12 16 
Repayments of Principal 
97* on Public loans 1970 20 5 1 1 0 15 
Interest Payments on 
92• w hternal Debt 1982 24 2 -1 -3 -6 14 ....... 
VI 
TABLE 5 \;.) ...... 
°' OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (STANDARD REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS): ECONCJ4IC VARIABLES, 
TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Factors Factors Factors 
Affecting Facil ftatfng Affectf ng External Publfc 
Total Publfc Total Debt/ Growth Debt External 
External Consumption Hfl f tary Exports In Service Debt 
Variables Debt 1982 Share Expenditure 1982 Consumption 1982 1970 
Repayment of Principal on 
Publfc External Loans 1970 100* -4 -4 0 -27 8 0 
Payment of Interest on 
External Public Debt 1970 97* -9 -1 6 -24 3 9 
Total Public External Debt 
1982 95* 1 -2 4 11 14 6 
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1982 94* 2 -4 2 15 11 -13 
",:;..ii Payment of Interest on External 
Public Debt 1982 89* 0 -2 0 12 23 -15 
. Public External Borrowing 
Comm! tments 1982 88* -4 -4 7 27 3 -5 
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1970 86* 
-2 3 3 -8 7 41 
Total Public External Debt 1970 70* 
-7 0 6 -10 -8 53 
> Repayment of Principal on ~ ~" Public External Debt 1982 61* 2 14 -4 26 37 12 en 
Gross Domestic Product 1982 52* -15 44 0 7 -24 -7 (j 0 
Growth in Exports 1970-82 46* 23 4 -37 z -18 -22 -12 ;l 
Current Account Balance 1920 -87* -11 17 5 -10 6 -5 ~ 
TABLE 5 (cont'd) t:l 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN !STANDARD REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS): ECON<J41C VARIABLES, I TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Factors Factors Factors z 
Affecting Fac11 ltatlng Affecting External Public ~ 
Total Public Total Debt/ Growth Debt External r;l External Con sump ti on Mfl I tary Exports In Service Debt 
Variables Debt 1982 Share Ex2endlture 1982 Consum~tlon 1982 1970 ~ Grilltth In Exports 1960-70 14 85* 13 -1 45 -8 
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1982/ ~ GDP 1982 9 87* l 26 -4 0 -10 
--! 
Public Consumption as S GDP ~ 1982 
-2 82* 18 1 -19 7 12 
Public External Debt S GDP ~ 1982 4 78* -13 14 -11 16 8 
Exports as S GDP 1982 
-7 75* 21 -10 6 21 -6 z t:l 
Public Consianptlon S GDP 196D -15 71* -7 -11 14 -3 31 ::i c: 
Resource Balance S GDP 1982 24 -53* 13 -26 -10 55 0 ~ 
Gross International Reserves 
1982 
-13 -12 89* 0 13 -11 11 
Gross National Product per 
Capita 1982 
-7 10 86* 0 -13 15 19 
Gross International Reserves 
1970 12 -2 83* -9 -12 -15 -14 
Total Military Expenditures 
1981 37 16 43* -14 -1 -26 26 
Current Account Balance 1982 
-19 4 -50* 5 -14 30 28 w 
-Private Consumption S GDP 1960 23 -12 -63* -3 9 -37 0 -...) 
TABLE 5 (cont'd) w 
...... 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN (STANDARD REGRESSICJ!I COEFFICIENTS): ECON()llC VARIABLES, 00 
TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Factors Factors Factors 
Affectf ng Facflftatlng Affectfng External Publfc 
Total Publ fc Total Debt/ Growth Debt External 
External Consumptfon Mfl ltary Exports In Servfce Debt 
Variables Debt 1982 Share Expendfture 1982 Consumptf on I9B2 1970 
Average Maturity of External 
Pub lf c Debt 1982 -8 4 -69* -9 0 -21 35 
Public External Loan 
Commf tments/Exports 1982 3 0 -3 95* 4 -20 -8 
Gross In fl ow Pub 1 fc Loans/ 
Exports 1982 8 13 11 88* -7 0 -12 
Publfc External Debt/Exports 
1982 4 2 -8 88* -2 -4 11 
Growth fn Private ConslJ!lptlon 
1970-82 -11 -10 6 20 86* 8 14 
Growth in Imports 1970-82 11 -7 -2 -8 82* -24 -6 
Growth In Public Consumption 2 4 -23 -19 68* -1 -5 
Terms of Trade 1982 20 21 26 5 46* 13 22 
Debt Service External Public ~ Debt.i Exports 1982 24 3 -7 -1 -4 74* 18 ~ 
tn 
Private Consumptf on i GDP 1982 
-12 -38 -37 6 -21 -41* -5 (') 
0 
Net Inflow Publfc External z 
Loans 1970 60 0 8 4 7 5 65* ~ 
Public External Debt i GDP 1970 0 12 -31 -1 5 36 59* ~ 
TABLE 6 
DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES, TOTAL COUNTRY 
SAMPLE, ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
(Standardized Estimates) 
Eguatlon !:E'.llB !:llPB PllX 
lnde~endent Var!a61es 
PDP PB~B GNPPE'.R 
HE81• 0.46 0.47 0.33 
(4.88) (3.97) (2.84) 
0.47 0.46 0.31 0.06 (4.87) (3.79) (2.54) (0.55) 
0.46 0.72 0.40 -0.37 (5.28) (5.09) (3.63) (-2.78) 
0.46 0.62 0.46 -0.33 0.18 (5.70) (4.44) (4.17) (-2.57) (2.35) 
0.47 0.40 0.40 0.21 (5.13) (3.83) (3.46) (2.58) 
0.47 0.50 0.43 (4.86) (3.81) (2.19) 
0.45 0.71 0.39 -0.50 (5.14) (4.91) (3.27) (-1.52) 
0.47 0.50 0.33 
(5.09) (4.31) (2.94) 
0.46 0.61 0.44 -0.45 (5.56) (4.27) (3.86) (-1.42) 
ROTE'.S: See text for deflnftfon of variables 
( ) • t statistic, 
r2 • correlation coefffcf ent 
F • F statistic 





















(-2.0) .732 25.29 
-0.18 



























320 ARMS CONTROL 
TABLE 7 
TOTAL MILITARY EXPENO[TURES, TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Country Actual Predicted Placement 
1. Uganda 97 1739 .0558 Below 
2. Rwanda 21 251 .0835 Below 
3. Senegal 55 426 .1288 Below 
4. Bolfvfa 196 1187 .1651 Below 
5. Liberia 36 207 .1737 Below 
6. Paraguay 78 425 .1832 Below 
7. El Salvador 116 556 .2085 Below 
8. Bunna 204 812 .2510 Below 
9. Trinidad 42 162 .2583 Below 
10. Ghana 141 317 .4435 Below 
11. Zfmbab 419 795 .5270 Below 
12. Dominican Rep. 104 183 .5657 Below 
13. Uruguay 363 603 .6012 Below 
14. Brazil 1837 2965 .6196 Below 
15. Ecuador 296 453 .6528 Below 
16. KU"111t 1254 1876 .6684 Below 
17. Sudan 289 417 .6921 Below 
18. Mexl co 1196 1713 .6982 Below 
19. Jordon 874 1213 .7205 Below 
20. ·Tunisia 228 261 .8720 Below 
21. Chfle 1175 1331 .8828 Below 
22. lndfa 5151 5787 .8901 Below 
23. ICe11Y1 198 222 .8906 Below 
24. Phil I ppf nes 848 824 1.0291 
25. Tanzania 277 257 1.0748 Above 
26. Syria 2437 2252 1.0821 Above 
27. Thailand 1335 1089 1.2259 Above 
28. Yenezue la 1059 842 1.2565 Above 
29. Spain 3655 2817 1.2975 Above 
30. Israel 4374 3242 1.3492 Above 
31. Korea 4157 2943 1.4125 Above 
32. Car 14 9 1.5078 Above 
33. Mor-occo 1080 698 1.5460 Above 
34. Argentina 3186 1921 1.6585 Above 
35. lndonesia 2867 1611 1. 7796 Above 
36. Peru 1026 569 1.8018 Above 
37. Mal~sfa 1446 536 2.6941 Above 
NOTES: Based on regresson equation: 
ME81 • 0.46GE08 + 0.62GOP + 0.45PDA - 0.33PBCB + 0.19GNPPER 
(S.70) (4.44) (4.17) (-2.57) (2.35) 
Below• Countries whose Actual is less than 9SS of Predicted value 






DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPE~OITURES, 
GROUP 1 COUNTRIES' ECDNCJo!IC VARIABLES 
•• 
Equation 
Triae~endent Vafla6les ·· - ------ - -S-tatf stfcs 
GEOB POB GDPDA POP ECNIA DSEB 6 IRBY rt F ow 
ME = Bl 0.25 0.77 
(2.99) (8.29) 
0.27 0.72 0.09 
(3,16) (7.58) (1.14) 
0.24 0.49 -0.07 0.54 
(3.13) (4.19) (-0.77) (3.14) 
0.25 0.49 0.47 
(3.34) (4.22) (3.25) 
0.20 0.36 
(2.96) (3.01) 
0.20 0.36 0.05 





Norrs:-See text for definitfon of variables 
( ) • t statistics 
r2 = correlation coefficient 
F • F statistic 
OF = degrees of freedom 
.862 77.78 27 
.868 52.92 27 
.909 44.36 27 
0.28 
(2.90) .907 56.92 27 
0.26 0.60 
(3.29) (4.14) .922 68.44 27 
0.27 0.55 
(3.00) (2.09) .923 52.15 27 
0.27 0.45 -0.19 
(4.00) (3.36) (-3.01) .945 72.91 26 
0.36 0.53 0.17 













DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES, GROUP 2 
COUNTRIES' ECON~IC VARIABLES 
Equation 
rndependent Variables StaffStlcs 
GEDB GDPB POA POA POP PBCB EC I BE ECIB rZ F Of' 
MESI • 0.67 0.76 (2.85) (3.21) 
0.52 0.83 0.51 -0.61 (2.57) (2.90) (2.38) (-2.41) 
0.48 1.12 3.39 -1.90 (3.70) (5.61) (4.49) (-5.13) 
0.43 0.91 2.73 -1.44 
(3.95) (4.93) (4.05) (-4.04) 
0.49 0.91 3.06 -1.46 (4.71) (5.04) (4.96) (-4.24) 
0.51 1.05 3.39 -2.49 
(6.06) (6.67) (6.54) (-4. 77) 
flOTES:- See text tor definition of variables ( ) = t statistic 
r2 • correlation coefficient 
F = F statf stfc 
OF = degrees of freedom 
.507 6.18 14 
.736 6.98 14 
-2.48 
(-3.88) .901 16.45 14 
-1.86 -0.25 
(-3.17) (-2.35) .941 21.55 14 
-2.18 -0.29 (-4.12) (-2.44) .944 22.32 14 
-2.38 -0.26 0.79 
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TABLE 10 
TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES, GROUP 2 COUNTRIES 
Country Actual Predicted Placement 
Rwanda 21 810 .2059 
Jordon 874 1695 .5156 
! Brazil 1837 2367 .7760 
.. 






Indh 5151 5266 .9782 
Venezuela 1059 1082 .9787 
Argentina 3186 3238 .9839 
Mexico 1196 1168 1.0289 
Spain 3655 3499 1.0445 
Korea 4157 3703 l.1226 
Kuwait 1254 1109 1.1307 
lndonesh 2867 2245 1.2771 
Ph fl I ppl nes 848 632 1.3407 
Thall and 1335 901 1.4816 
Malays fl 1446 892 1.6196 
NOTES: Based on regression equation: 
ME81 • 0.48GED8 + l.12GOP - l.90POB + J,39POA - 2.49POP 







Below • Countries whose Actual fs less than 951 of Predicted value 
Above • Countries whose Actual Is greater than 1051 of Predicted value 
NOTES, 
1. A. Martin and W.A. Lewis, 'Patterns of Public Revenue and Expenditure', 
Manchester School (1956), pp.203-44. 
2. Cf. Adolph Wagner, Finanzwissenschaft, Part I (Leipzig: C.F. Winter, 1887) and 
A. Wagner, Finanzwissenschaft, Part II, 2nd edition (Leipzig: C.F. Winter, 1890). 
3. A. Peacock and Mack Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditures in the United 
Kingdom (National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton University Press, 
1961). 
4. Walter Heller, United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, Taxes and 
Fiscal Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: United Nations, 1954), p.6. 
5. The World Bank data consists of the entire statistical supplement to its World 
Development Report 1984 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), plus data 
for 1975 contained in its World Development Report 1978 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978). 
? 6. The IMF data consists of government expenditures by type and is taken from the 
International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
(Washington: IMF, 1983). 
! 7. Charles Taylor and David Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, Third Edition, Volume 1, Gross National Attributes and Rates (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). The entin! data base was put on-line for 
analysis. 
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8. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers, 1975-82 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1984). 
9. Critiques of Wagner's Law are given in R. Bird, 'Wagner's "Law" of Expanding 
State Activity', Public Finance (Vol. 26, 1971), pp. 1-26; Tack Diamond, 
'Wagner's "Law" and the Developing Countries', The Developing Economies 
(1977), pp.37-59; I. Coffman, 'On the Empirical Testing of "Wagner's Law": A 
Technical Note', Public Finance (1968) pp.359-64. I. Coffman and DJ. Mahar, 
'The Growth of Public Expenditures in Selected Developing Nations: Six 
Caribbean Countries, 1940-65', Public Finance (1971), pp.57-72; Yed Gandhi, 
'Wagner's Law of Public Expenditure: Do Recent Cross-Section Studies Confirm 
It?' Public Finance (1971), pp.44-56; R. Wagner and W.E. Weber, 'Wagner's Law, 
Fiscal Institutions, and the Growth of Government', National Tax Journal (1977), 
pp.59-68. 
10. J.R. Lotz, 'Patterns of Government Spending in Developing Countries', 
Manchester School (1970), pp.119-44. 
11. David Whynes, The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1979). 
12. Institute of International Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London), 
various issues. 
13. Alan Tait and Peter Heller, International Comparisons of Government Expenditure 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1982). 
14. Ibid., p.9. 
15. See P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence', Journal of 
Economic Development (July 1982), pp.113-25; P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. 
Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries', 
Armed Forces and Society (Summer 1983) pp.633-45; P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. 
Looney, 'Another Look at Defense Spending and Economic Growth in Develop-
ing Countries', Defense Analysis (forthcoming 1985), and P.C. Frederiksen and 
R.E. Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries: A Reply', Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1985), pp.298-301. 
16. P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. Looney, 'Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth 
in Developing Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence', op. cit., p.117. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid., p.118. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., p.124. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Cf. SAS, op. cit., for a description of this program. The sample countries were 
initially assigned an arbitrary one or zero so that placement could be made into two 
groups. A three-group division of countries did not produce a clear split between 
the means of the groups, i.e., there was not a high probability of correct placement 
for each country in one of the three groups. 
